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Abstract
Using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with banking, this paper first provides
evidence that, during the Great Moderation, monetary policy leaned against the wind blowing
from the loan market in the US. It then shows that the extent to which this occurred delivers
a small welfare loss relative to the optimised simple interest-rate rule that features only a
response to inflation. The source of business cycle fluctuations is crucial for the optimality of
a leaning-against-the-wind policy. In fact, the pro-cyclical nature of lending creates a trade-off
between inflation and financial stabilisation when supply shocks are prevalent.
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1 Introduction
The role of central banks in promoting financial stability, in addition to inflation stability, has
been debated well before the Great Recession. The so-called “Greenspan doctrine”, which objects
to the policy of leaning against the wind blowing from asset-price bubbles, and favours the policy
of cleaning after asset-price bubbles burst, greatly influenced the central banking world before
the crisis. However, in the aftermath of the Great Recession, the need to protect the banking
sector from periods of unduly high or excessively low credit growth has led to a renewed interest
in the “lean” versus “clean” role for monetary policy. For instance, Aksoy et al. (2013) show that
monetary policy can play an important role in terms of macroeconomic stabilisation if a leaning-
against-the-wind policy is implemented within Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE)
models featuring credit market imperfections.
Mishkin (2011) distinguishes between two types of asset-price bubbles: (i) a credit-driven
bubble; and (ii) an irrational exuberance bubble. He argues that credit-driven bubbles are easier
to detect and pose much more risk to the economic system and, as a result, he advocates policies
contrasting them. Indeed, the important role of credit market conditions in affecting business cycle
fluctuations emerges also from the Basel III framework, aiming at protecting the financial sector
from periods of excessive credit growth, often associated with growth in systemic risk. On this
aspect, Jordà et al. (2013) document that, in a sample of 14 countries and a period between 1870
and 2008, more credit-intensive expansions tended to be followed by deeper recessions and slower
recoveries. Their measure of “excess credit” build-up during expansions is the rate of change of
bank loans to GDP, in deviation from its mean. Furthermore Bordo and Haubrich (2012) provide
empirical evidence that bank lending significantly affects GDP fluctuations in the United States.
This paper focuses precisely on bank lending and on whether monetary policy responded and
should respond to credit exuberance. First, it provides Bayesian estimates of a DSGE model in
which frictions in the bank-loan market arise due to the presence of lending relationships, and
monetary policy is set according to a credit-growth-augmented Taylor-type rule. The model is
otherwise standard and exhibits the real and nominal frictions commonly found in the mainstream
literature. Then, the paper provides also a normative analysis via the computation of optimised
simple interest-rate rules. We deem this strategy to be appropriate as (i) Bayesian estimation is
suitable to empirically assess whether a leaning-against-the-wind policy can be detected in standard
US macroeconomic data and to estimate the shocks, which we find to be key determinants of
optimal policy, and (ii) optimised simple rules unveil whether the credit-growth-augmented Taylor-
type rule is welfare-optimal.
Lending relationships (LR) provide an appealing determinant of the bank spread, i.e. the
difference between the loan rate and the deposit rate, and prove empirically important. Among
other studies using US data, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010, 2011) provide substantial evidence of
LR, the average duration of which is 11 years according to Petersen and Rajan (1994). This is in
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agreement with the findings of Santos and Winton (2008) who show that during recessions banks
raise the bank spread more for bank-dependent borrowers than for those with access to public bond
markets. Among the studies analysing LR in the DSGE arena, Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010)
introduce this friction into an otherwise standard Real Business Cycle model where counter-cyclical
bank spreads play a financial accelerator role in the propagation mechanism of technology shocks.
Aksoy et al. (2013) show that LR is a feature of financial intermediation relevant for monetary
policy making in a New Keynesian (NK) model with staggered prices and cost channels. Melina
and Villa (2014) build a medium-scale DSGE model with a banking sector exploiting LR to study
the implications that fiscal policy has on loan market conditions. In order to tractably introduce
LR into a DSGE model, these studies assume that firms form habits at the level of each variety of
loans. In other words they form deep habits in banking analogously to how consumers form deep
habits in consumption in the model of Ravn et al. (2006).
The paper provides an estimate of the parameter representing the interest-rate response to
nominal credit growth within the monetary policy rule. This turns out to be statistically positive
and economically important. A constrained version of the model featuring a standard Taylor-type
rule, in which the interest rate exhibits inertia and responds to inflation and output, leads to a
significantly lower marginal data density. In other words, estimates point to an evidence that
during the Great Moderation monetary policy leaned against the wind blowing from the loan
market and that this had a partial stabilisation role towards credit exuberance.
Is this the welfare-optimal policy? To answer this question, we perform a welfare comparison
of alternative interest-rate rules: first, a standard optimised simple Taylor-type rule; second, an
optimised simple rule featuring also a response to nominal credit growth or other financial variables;
third, the estimated credit-growth-augmented interest-rate rule. In designing the optimised simple
rules, we impose an approximate zero-lower-bound constraint in a way similar to Levine et al.
(2008). We find that optimal monetary policy features a muted response to output and to any
financial variable in the model. While the former result is in line with the findings of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007) in a model with perfect credit markets, the latter is a novel contribution.
The explanation of such a finding lies in the fact that supply shocks – technology, price and wage
mark-up – turn out to be the main drivers of output, lending and inflation fluctuations in the
estimated model. Since these shocks imply a trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation,
there is no “divine coincidence” (Blanchard and Galí, 2007). Given the pro-cyclical behaviour of
lending in the model, a monetary policy that responds also to financial variables should respond
more aggressively to inflation. As a result, it turns out to be optimal for monetary policy to
respond exclusively to inflation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the DSGE model.
Section 3 outlines the estimation strategy, discusses empirical results and investigates the dynamic
properties of the estimated model via impulse responses and variance decomposition analysis.
Section 4 examines the welfare implications of alternative interest-rate policies. Finally, Section
3
5 concludes. The appendix complements the paper by providing (a) the full set of the DSGE
model equilibrium conditions; (b) the derivation of the deterministic steady state; (c) details
on the construction of the dataset; (d) additional estimation results; and (e) robustness exercises
highlighting that the sources of business cycle fluctuations are crucial for the optimal policy results.
2 Model
The model is a NK model with standard frictions à la Smets and Wouters (2007) augmented with
a banking sector that exploit lending relationships. While this section outlines the optimisation
problem of each agent in the model, equilibrium conditions evaluated at the symmetric equilibrium
and the deterministic steady state are reported in Appendices A and B.
2.1 Households
Households are infinitely-lived and solve an inter-temporal utility maximisation problem. The
economy is populated by a continuum of households indexed by j ∈ (0, 1). Each household’s
preferences are represented by the following inter-temporal utility function:
U jt = Et
∞∑
s=0
eBt+sβ
t+s
[(
Xjt+s
)φ (
1−Hjt+s
)1−φ]1−σc
1− σc , (1)
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, eBt is a preference shock, Xjt is habit-adjusted consumption,
Hjt is labor supply in terms of hours worked, σc is the relative risk aversion parameter and φ is a
preference parameter affecting labor supply. Total time available to households is normalised to
unity, thus 1−Hjt represents leisure time. As in Fuhrer (2000), Xjt is given by
Xt
j = Cjt − θSt−1, (2)
St = ρSt−1 + (1− ρ)Ct, (3)
where Cjt is the level of consumption, St is the stock of external habit formation, θ ∈ (0, 1) is the
degree of habit formation, and ρ ∈ (0, 1) is the persistence of the stock of habit.
Each household j is a monopolistic provider of a differentiated labor service and supplies labor
Hjt to satisfy demand,
Hjt =
(
wjt
wt
)−eWt ηW
Ht, (4)
where wjt is the real wage charged by household j, wt is the average real wage in the economy, ηW
is the intra-temporal elasticity of substitution across labor services, eWt is a wage mark-up shock,
and Ht is average demand of labor services by firms. Similarly to Zubairy (2014), the households’
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budget constraint also includes a Rotemberg quadratic cost of adjusting the nominal wage, W jt ,
which is zero at the steady state. This cost is proportional to the average real value of labor
services as in Furlanetto (2011), ξ
W
2
(
W jt
W jt−1
− Π¯
)2
wtHt =
ξW
2
(
wjt
wjt−1
Πt − Π¯
)2
wtHt, where ξW is
the wage adjustment cost parameter, Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is the gross inflation rate of price index Pt, and
Π¯ is the steady state value of inflation.
The representative household enters period t with Djt units of real deposits in the bank. During
period t, the household chooses to consume Cjt ; supplies H
j
t hours of work; receive real wage wt,
firms’ profits
´ 1
0
Πitdi, banks’ profits
´ 1
0
Πbtdb, bears the wage adjustment cost, pays lump-sum
taxes Tt, and allocates savings in deposits at the bank, Djt+1, that pay the net interest rate RDt+1
between t and t+ 1. Therefore, the budget constraint reads as
Cjt +D
j
t+1 +
ξW
2
(
wjt
wjt−1
Πt − Π¯
)2
wtHt ≤ wjtHjt + (1 +RDt )Djt +
ˆ 1
0
Πitdi+
ˆ 1
0
Πbtdb− Tt. (5)
Each household maximises inter-temporal utility (1) with respect to Cjt , D
j
t+1, w
j
t subject to
(2), (3), (4) and (5).
2.2 Entrepreneurs
Entrepreneurs are distributed over a unit interval and indexed by e ∈ (0, 1). They borrow from
banks to produce a differentiated output, Y et sold in a imperfectly competitive market at price P et .
Entrepreneurs solve two optimisation problems: an intra-temporal problem, giving rise to lending
relationships, in which they decide the composition of their loan demand; and an inter-temporal
problem in which they maximise the flow of discounted profits by choosing the quantity of factors
for production and the price level.
Entrepreneurs minimise their borrowing costs by choosing their demand for each variety of loans
and exhibit deep habits in lending.1 This feature is present also in the models by Aliaga-Diaz and
Olivero (2010), Aksoy et al. (2013), and Melina and Villa (2014) and represents a reduced form
way to incorporate the effects of informational asymmetries on borrowers’ creditworthiness that
lead to lending relationships into a DSGE model. Although the deep habits framework is not a
formal setup of asymmetric information, it produces the same effects in the symmetric equilibrium
1An other important component of firm’s debt in the US is non-banking finance. This paper focuses on bank-
to-firm relationships, hence it abstracts from the issuance of corporate bonds. For a model featuring also corporate
bonds see e.g. De Fiore and Uhlig (2011).
5
(as shown by Aksoy et al., 2013, Appendix). The optimisation problem consists in the following:
min
Lebt
ˆ 1
0
(1 +RLbt)L
e
btdb, (6)
s.t.
[ˆ 1
0
(Lebt − θLSLbt−1)1−
1
ηL db
]1/(1− 1
ηL
)
=
(
XLt
)e
, (7)
SLbt = %
LSLbt−1 + (1− %L)Lbt, (8)
where RLbt is the net lending rate, Lebt is the demand by firm e for loans issued by bank b, θL is
the degree of habit in lending, SLbt is the stock of (external) habit in lending, ηL is the elasticity of
substitution across varieties of loans,
(
XLt
)e is the demand for loans by firm e augmented by lending
relationships and %L is the persistence of lending relationships. Equation (6) represents overall
lending expenditure, equation (7) imposes deep habits in lending, and (8) imposes persistence in
the stock of habit.
Entrepreneur e faces also an inter-temporal problem by solving which she chooses employment
Het , capital Ket+1, investment Iet , capital utilisation, U et , and the price level, P et to maximise the
expected discounted value of its lifetime profits. Recalling that in this economy firms are owned
by households, the stochastic discount factor of the former, Λt,t+1, is given by the inter-temporal
marginal rate of substitution of the latter. The inter-temporal optimisation problem is summarised
by the following:
max
Het ,K
e
t+1,I
e
t ,U
e
t ,P
e
t
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s

P et+s
Pt+s
Yt+s −Wt+sHet+s − Iet+s
−Ψ (U et+s)Ket+s − ξ2 ( Pit+sPit+s−1 − Π¯)2 Yt+s
+
(
XLt+s
)e − ´ 1
0
(1 +RLbt+s−1)L
e
bt+s−1db+ Ξ
e
t+s
 , (9)
s.t. Ket+1 = I
e
t
[
1− S
(
Iet
Iet−1
)]
eIt + (1− δ)Ket , (10)
ˆ 1
0
Lebtdb ≥ Iet (11)
Y et =
(
P et
Pt
)−ePt η
Yt = F (e
A
t , U
e
t , K
e
t , H
e
t ) (12)
Equation (9) is the sum of discounted profits expressed in terms of net cash flows, in which WtHet
is the wage bill; Iet is the expenditure in investment goods; using capital at rate U et entails a
cost of Ψ (U et )Ket , where Ψ (Ut) = γ1 (Ut − 1) + γ22 (Ut − 1)2;2 ξ2
(
P et+s
P et+s−1
− Π¯
)2
Yt+s is a Rotemberg
2We normalise the steady-state utilisation rate to unity, u = 1. It follows that Ψ (u) = 0, Ψ′ (u) = γ1, Ψ′′ (u) = γ2
and the elasticity of the utilization rate to changes in the marginal utilization cost is Ψ
′(u)
Ψ′′(u)u =
γ1
γ2
≡ σu ≡ 1−ηuηu .
Following Smets and Wouters (2007) we estimate ηu ∈ [0, 1].
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convex cost of adjusting prices; Ξet ≡ θL
´ 1
0
1+RLbt
1+RLt
SLbt−1db such that
(
XLt
)e
+ Ξet =
´ 1
0
Lebtdb = L
e
t ,
i.e. the amount of loans that flow into the entrepreneur’s balance sheet, while
´ 1
0
(1 + RLbt)L
e
btdb
represents what they repay to banks. Equation (10) is a standard law of motion of capital, which
depreciates at rate δ, and investment is subject to adjustment costs, where S (1) = S ′(1) = 0
and S ′′ (1) > 0. In particular, following Smets and Wouters (2007), we assume that investment
adjustment costs are quadratic: S
(
It
It−1
)
= ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
, ψ > 0, where ψ represents the elasticity
of the marginal investment adjustment cost to changes in investment. The term eIt represents a
shock to the investment-specific technology process. Constraint (11) makes it necessary for firms
to borrow from banks in order to finance investment expenditure, i.e. it represents a financing
constraint needed for external credit to play a role in the model. Without the imposition of this
constraint, firms would always find it optimal to satisfy their financing needs via internal funds.
Thus constraint (11) holds with equality in equilibrium. Lastly, expression (12) equates the firm-
specific Dixit-Stiglitz demand with intra-temporal elasticity of substitution η and subject to price
mark-up shock ePt , with firm’s production, which we assume to obey to a Cobb-Douglas technology,
F (eAt , Ut, Kt, Ht) = e
A
t (Ht)
α (UtKt)
1−α, with α being the labor share of income and eAt being a total
factor productivity shock.
2.3 Banks
Each bank b chooses its demand for deposits, Dbt+1, and the loan rate, RLbt+1, to maximise the
expected discounted value of its lifetime profits. Banks are owned by households as well; therefore,
their stochastic discount factor, Λt,t+1, is given by the inter-temporal marginal rate of substitution
of the households. The optimisation problem is summarised by the following:
max
Dbt+1,R
L
bt+1
Et
∞∑
s=0
Λt,t+s
{
Dbt+s+1 − Lbt+s+1 + (1 +RLbt+s)Lbt+s − (1 +RDt+s)Dbt+s
}
, (13)
s.t. Lbt = Dbt, (14)
Lbt =
(
1 +RLbt
1 +RLt
)−ηL
XLt + θ
LSLbt−1. (15)
Equation (13) represents the cash flow of the bank in each period, given by the difference between
deposits and loans and the difference between earnings on assets, priced at the net rate RLbt, and
interest payments on liabilities. Equation (14) represents the bank’s balance sheet, where loans on
the asset side are equal to deposits on the liabilities side. Equation (15) represents the bank-specific
demand for loans.
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2.4 Central bank
A central bank conducts monetary policy by following a Taylor-type rule,
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= ρr log
(
Rnt−1
R¯n
)
+(1−ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ρs log
(
Lt
Lt−1
Πt
)]
+eRt , (16)
where Rnt is the gross nominal interest rate, and ρr, ρpi, ρy, and ρs are policy parameters referring to
interest-rate smoothing, the responsiveness of the nominal interest rate to inflation deviations, to
output, and to nominal credit growth (as e.g. Christiano et al., 2010b,a, among others), respectively,
while eRt is a monetary policy shock. We include output in deviation from steady state instead of
the output gap so that the central bank responds only to observable variables (see e.g. Faia and
Monacelli, 2007; Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2007) A Fisher equation links the net real deposit rate
RDt+1 to the gross nominal interest rate, 1 + RDt+1 = Et
[
Rnt
Πt+1
]
. Alternative monetary policy rules
are employed in Appendix E.
2.5 Equilibrium
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget, i.e. Tt = eGt , where eGt is government
spending. In the symmetric equilibrium all markets clear.
The model is closed by the resource constraint,
Yt = Ct + It + e
G
t +
ξ
2
(
Πt − Π¯
)2
Yt +
ξW
2
(
ΠWt − Π¯
)2
wtHt + Ψ (Ut)Kt, (17)
a set of AR(1) processes,
log
(
eκt
e¯κ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
e¯κ
)
+ κt , (18)
where κ = {A,B,G, I, R, P,W}, e¯κ are steady-state values, ρκ are auto-regressive parameters,
and κt are mean zero, i.i.d. random shocks with standard deviations σκ.
3 Estimation
This section reports the results of the Bayesian estimation. Subsection 3.1 discusses the data and
the estimation strategy. Subsection 3.2 presents parameter estimates and a marginal likelihood
comparison confirming the leaning-against-the-wind policy from an empirical viewpoint. Subsec-
tion 3.3 discusses estimated impulse responses of key macroeconomic and financial variables to
the structural shocks of the model and disentangles the stabilisation properties of a credit-growth-
augmented Taylor rule. Finally, Subsection 3.4 presents the analysis of the variance decomposition
to assess the importance of the exogenous structural shocks.
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3.1 Data and estimation strategy
The model is estimated with Bayesian methods (see An and Schorfheide, 2007; Smets and Wouters,
2007, among others). The Kalman filter is used to evaluate the likelihood function of the observable
variables. The likelihood function and the prior distribution of the parameters are combined to
calculate the posterior distributions. The posterior Kernel is then simulated numerically using the
Metropolis-Hasting algorithm with two chains of 150,000 draws each. This Markov Chain Monte
Carlo method generates draws from the posterior density and updates the candidate parameter
after each draw.
The model is estimated for the US over the Great Moderation period, 1984Q1–2008Q2, using a
deliberately standard set of macroeconomic variables. In particular, we use the following observable
seven variables: GDP, consumption, investment, wage, hours worked, GDP deflator inflation and
the federal funds rate.3 Although observations on all variables are available at least from 1955
onwards, we focus on the above-mentioned period because it is characterised by a single monetary
policy regime. Extending the sample period to include the Great Recession may yield biased
estimates due to the nonlinearities induced by the fact than the nominal interest rate in the US
reached the zero lower bound (on this see e.g. Galí et al., 2011). The number of variables in
the data coincides with the number of shocks in the model. The following set of measurement
equations show the link between the observables in the dataset and the endogenous variables of
the DSGE model:

∆Y ot
∆Cot
∆Iot
∆W ot
Hot
piot
rn,ot

=

γ
γ
γ
γ
h¯
p¯i
r¯n

+

Yˆt − Yˆt−1
Cˆt − Cˆt−1
Iˆt − Iˆt−1
Wˆt − Wˆt−1
Hˆt
Πˆt
Rˆnt

(19)
where variables on the left-hand side are the observables, γ is the common quarterly trend growth
rate of GDP, consumption, investment and wages; h¯ is average hours worked; p¯i is the average
quarterly inflation rate; and r¯n is the average quarterly nominal interest rate. A hat over a
variable indicates the log-deviation from its own steady state.
Our general estimation and calibration strategy follows the standard procedure proposed by
Smets and Wouters (2007). Table 1 shows the calibration of the parameters which could not
be identified in the dataset and/or are related to steady-state values of the variables. The time
period in the model corresponds to one quarter in the data. The discount factor, β, is equal
to the conventional value of 0.99, implying an annual steady-state real interest rate of 4%. The
capital depreciation rate, δ, is equal to 0.025, amounting to an annual depreciation of 10%. As
3See Appendix C for a detailed discussion of data sources, definitions and transformations.
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Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.99
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.025
Production function parameter α 0.67
Elasticity of substitution in goods η 6
Elasticity of substitution in labor ηW 11
Elasticity of substitution in banking ηL set to target RL −RD = 0.0076
Preference parameter φ set to target H = 0.33
Government share of output G
Y
0.19
Table 1: Calibrated parameters
standard, the labor share of income, α, is equal to 0.67. The elasticity of substitution across
different varieties, η, is equal to 6 in order to target a steady state gross mark-up equal to 1.20.
The elasticity of substitution in the banking sector, ηL, is set in order to match a spread between
the bank prime loan rate and the 3-month Treasury bill rate of 304 basis points per year – given the
estimated value of lending relationship parameter θL – consistently with US data during the Great
Moderation. The elasticity of substitution in the labor market, ηW is set equal to 11 as in Del
Negro et al. (2011), implying a steady state gross mark-up of 1.10. The preference parameter, φ, is
set to target steady state hours of work equal to 0.33. The government-output ratio is calibrated
at 0.19, in line with the data.
The remaining parameters governing the dynamics of the model are estimated using Bayesian
techniques.4 The locations of the prior means correspond to a large extent to those in previous
studies on the US economy, e.g. Smets and Wouters (2007). We use the Inverse Gamma (IG)
distribution for the standard deviation of the shocks and we set a loose prior with 2 degrees of
freedom. We use the Beta distribution for all parameters bounded between 0 and 1. For the
unbounded parameters we use the Normal distribution. In addition, we set the prior means of the
constants in the measurement equations equal to average values in the dataset. There are a few
non-standard structural parameters. As regards the parameters measuring lending relationships
we choose prior means close to the values estimated by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010), equal
to 0.70 for θL and to 0.80 for ρL, and we set a standard deviation of 0.125 for both. The prior
distribution of the parameter measuring the response of the nominal interest rate to nominal credit
growth, ρs, is on purpose loose. In fact, as shown in Figure 1, a prior mean of zero and a standard
deviation of 0.30 enable the prior distribution to encompass a broad range of values around zero.
This allows us to be agnostic on whether monetary policy leaned against the wind or not during
the Great Moderation. Table 2 summarises the prior distributions chosen to estimate the deep
structural parameters and the shock processes.
4Version 4.3.3 of the Dynare toolbox for Matlab is used for the estimation.
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Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distrib. Mean Std/df
Structural
Relative risk aversion σc Normal 1.50 0.10 1.54 [1.37;1.70]
Habits in consumption θ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.63 [0.53;0.72]
Habit persist. in consumption ρ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.62 [0.49;0.76]
Deep habits in banking θL Beta 0.70 0.125 0.73 [0.54;0.99]
Habit persist. in banking %L Beta 0.80 0.125 0.79 [0.62; 0.97]
Price stickiness ξ Normal 30.0 5.00 43.75 [36.79;50.59]
Wage stickiness ξW Normal 100.0 10.00 95.84 [78.28;114.30]
Invest. adjust. costs ψ Normal 4.00 1.50 4.65 [2.37;6.89]
Capital utilisation ηu Beta 0.50 0.15 0.86 [0.77;0.95]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi Normal 1.50 0.20 2.01 [1.73;2.32]
Output -Taylor rule ρy Beta 0.10 0.05 0.02 [0.00;0.04]
Credit growth-Taylor rule ρs Normal 0.00 0.30 0.30 [0.18;0.41]
Interest rate smoothing ρr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.86 [0.83;0.89]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ Normal 0.44 0.10 0.43 [0.38;0.48]
Inflation rate p¯i Gamma 0.63 0.10 0.66 [0.58;0.75]
Interest rate r¯n Gamma 1.31 0.10 1.30 [1.17;1.41]
Hours of work h¯ Normal 0.00 0.10 -0.01 [-0.17;0.15]
Shocks
TFP ρA Beta 0.50 0.20 0.95 [0.90;1.00]
σA IG 0.10 2.0 0.46 [0.41;0.52]
Government spending ρG Beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 [0.94;0.99]
σG IG 0.10 2.0 2.25 [1.96;2.52]
Interest rate σR IG 0.10 2.0 0.13 [0.11;0.15]
Investment-specific ρI Beta 0.50 0.20 0.68 [0.55;0.80]
σI IG 0.10 2.0 3.40 [1.60;5.04]
Preference ρB Beta 0.50 0.20 0.80 [0.70;0.90]
σB IG 0.10 2.0 1.47 [1.12;1.82]
Price mark-up ρP Beta 0.50 0.20 0.89 [0.82;0.98]
σP IG 0.10 2.0 1.37 [1.16;1.60]
Wage mark-up ρW Beta 0.50 0.20 0.79 [0.69;0.89]
σW IG 0.10 2.0 4.81 [3.49;6.13]
Log-likelihood -539.818
Table 2: Prior and posterior distributions of estimated parameters
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Figure 1: Prior and posterior probability densities of the Taylor rule parameters
3.2 Estimation results
Table 2 reports the posterior mean with 95% probability intervals in square brackets and the log-
likelihood of the model. There is evidence of both habit in consumption and habit persistence,
with statistically positive parameter values, the mean of which equals 0.63 and 0.62 respectively.
The degree of deep habits in banking is equal to 0.73 with a persistence of 0.79. The point estimate
of the degree of deep habits in banking is very close to the one found via single-equation GMM
estimation by Aliaga-Diaz and Olivero (2010).
The degree of price stickiness implies that firms adjust prices almost every three quarters and
a half, while the estimate of the Rotemberg parameter for wage stickiness is higher, in line with
Zubairy (2014). TFP and government spending are more persistent than the other shocks.
As regards the Taylor rule parameters, in line with many other studies, estimates capture
nominal interest rate inertia and that, during the Great Moderation, monetary policy was more
aggressive on inflation than on the output gap, with posterior estimates of the latter parameter
in the range [0.00, 0.04]. A novel result is that the monetary authority is found to respond to
nominal credit growth with a point estimate for coefficient ρs of 0.30 and a confidence interval of
[0.18, 0.41].
Figure 1 shows the prior and posterior densities of the Taylor rule parameters, which are well
identified by the data. This is particularly important for ρs, i.e. the responsiveness of the nominal
interest rate to credit growth, which exhibits a posterior distribution entirely located around
positive values, with the probability density tightly gathered around the posterior mean, despite
the loose prior.
This last result is confirmed also by a log-likelihood race between the baseline model and a
12
Baseline ρs = 0
Log-likelihood −539.818 −550.132
Bayes factor 3.01× 104
Kass-Raftery statistics 20.63
Table 3: Model comparison
restricted model featuring a standard Taylor rule, i.e. with ρs = 0. The last two rows of Table 3
report the Bayes factor (BF) and the statistics by Kass and Raftery (1995) (KR).5 According to
Jeffreys (1998), a BF of 3− 10 provides “slight” evidence in favour of model i relative to model j;
a BF in the range [10− 100] provides “strong to very strong” evidence; and a BF greater than 100
provides “decisive evidence”. Hence, here we find “decisive evidence” in favour of a model featuring
a credit-growth-augmented Taylor rule over a standard one. The KR statistics is computed as twice
the log of the BF. A KR statistics of around 21 also points to “very strong” evidence in favour of
the unconstrained baseline model versus the restricted model featuring a standard Taylor rule, the
full estimation of which is reported in Appendix D.6In other words, these results point to evidence
that, during the Great Moderation, monetary policy leaned against the wind blowing from the
loan market. So far the literature has focused more on the response of monetary policy to asset
prices. For instance, on the empirical side, Castelnuovo and Nisticò (2010) argue that a model
where the monetary authority has an active concern towards stock-market fluctuations is supported
by US data. Our results complement the findings of Christiano et al. (2010b), whose estimates
identify a significant degree of “leaning against credit exuberance” in the euro area monetary policy
framework for the period 1985Q1-2008Q2.
3.3 Dynamic properties of the estimated model
In this section we disentangle the effects of the estimated leaning-against-the-wind policy versus a
standard Taylor rule via the analysis of the responses of key macroeconomic variables to all seven
structural shocks in the model. In Figure 2 we report impulse responses to shocks of size one percent
that determine a fall in real output. The solid line represents responses within the estimated model
featuring the credit-growth augmented Taylor rule, whereas the dashed line represents responses
of a counterfactual model with ρs = 0.
5Let mi be a given model, with mi ∈M , and L(Y |mi) be the marginal data density of model i for the common
dataset Y , then the BF between model i and model j is computed as:
BFi/j =
L(Y |mi)
L(Y |mj) =
exp(LL(Y |mi))
exp(LL(Y |mj))
where LL stands for log-likelihood.
6Values of the KR statistics above 10 can be considered “very strong” evidence in favour of model i relative to
model j; between 6 and 10 represent “strong” evidence; between 2 and 6 “positive” evidence; while values below 2
are “not worth more than a bare mention”.
13
Q
ua
rte
rs
Percentage deviations from steady state
5
10
−0
.8
−0
.6
−0
.4
Te
ch
no
lo
gy
   
Output
5
10
−2
.5−2
−1
.5−1
Lending
5
10
0.
01
0.
02
0.
03
Bank Spread
5
10
0
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
Inflation
5
10
0.
02
0.
04
0.
06
0.
080.
1
Nom. Int. Rate
5
10
−0
.1
−0
.0
50
0.
05
Pr
ef
er
en
ce
   
5
10
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
5
10
−6−4−2
x 
10
−3
5
10
−0
.0
6
−0
.0
4
−0
.0
20
5
10
−0
.0
3
−0
.0
2
−0
.0
1
5
10
−0
.1
2
−0
.1
−0
.0
8
−0
.0
6
In
ve
st
m
en
t  
 
5
10
−0
.6
−0
.4
5
10
0510
x 
10
−3
5
10
−2
0
−1
00
x 
10
−3
5
10
−0
.0
3
−0
.0
2
−0
.0
1
5
10
−0
.1
6
−0
.1
4
−0
.1
2
−0
.1
−0
.0
8
G
ov
. s
pe
nd
.  
5
10
0.
04
0.
06
0.
080.
1
0.
12
5
10
−1
5
−1
0−5
x 
10
−4
5
10
−1
5
−1
0−50
x 
10
−3
5
10
−8−6−4
x 
10
−3
5
10
−1
.2−1
−0
.8
−0
.6
−0
.4
M
on
. p
ol
ic
y 
 
5
10
−2−1
5
10
0
0.
02
0.
04
5
10
−0
.6
−0
.4
−0
.2
5
10
0
0.
2
0.
4
0.
6
0.
8
5
10
−0
.1
−0
.0
5W
ag
e 
m
ar
k−
up
 
5
10
−0
.3
5
−0
.3
−0
.2
5
−0
.2
−0
.1
5
5
10
024
x 
10
−3
5
10
0
0.
02
0.
04
5
10
0.
00
5
0.
01
0.
01
5
0.
02
5
10
−0
.4
−0
.3
−0
.2
Pr
ic
e 
m
ar
k−
up
5
10
−1
−0
.5
5
10
51015
x 
10
−3
5
10
0
0.
050.
1
0.
15
Ta
yl
or
 ru
le
 a
ug
m
en
te
d 
w
ith
 re
sp
on
se
 to
 c
re
di
t g
ro
w
th
 (b
as
el
in
e 
m
od
el
)
St
an
da
rd
 T
ay
lo
r r
ul
e 
(re
st
ric
te
d 
m
od
el
)
5
10
0
0.
02
0.
04
Sh
oc
ks
F
ig
ur
e
2:
Im
pu
ls
e
re
sp
on
se
s
of
se
le
ct
ed
va
ri
ab
le
s
to
st
ru
ct
ur
al
sh
oc
ks
of
si
ze
1
pe
rc
en
t
in
th
e
es
ti
m
at
ed
m
od
el
fe
at
ur
in
g
a
Ta
yl
or
ru
le
au
gm
en
te
d
w
it
h
a
re
sp
on
se
to
cr
ed
it
gr
ow
th
an
d
w
it
h
a
re
st
ri
ct
ed
m
od
el
w
it
h
a
st
an
da
rd
Ta
yl
or
ru
le
14
In particular, the model features four aggregate demand shocks (preference, investment-specific,
government spending, monetary policy), in which output and inflation move in the same direction,
and three aggregate supply shocks (technology, wage mark-up and price mark-up), in which output
and inflation move in opposite directions.
A number of noteworthy results emerge from the inspection of Figure 2. First, while the sign
of impulse responses is preserved across the two Taylor rule specifications, the severity of the
economic downturn generated by each shock varies. Second, with the exception of the preference
and government spending shocks, lending positively comoves with real output and the bank spread
exhibits a counter-cyclical behaviour. This is a feature of lending relationships: in the simulated
contractions future profits are expected to be low (indeed real output persistently remains below
steady state), hence banks find it optimal to exploit current lending relationships by charging
higher bank spreads and enhancing current profits.
As far as the contractionary preference shock is concerned, this generates a shorter-lived output
contraction and an overshooting. The explanation is in the fact that such a shock determines a
fall of future marginal utility of consumption relative to the current one, and this leads to a fall
in consumption and an increase in savings. The subsequent greater availability of financial funds
makes banks willing to supply more loans, which in turn boost future economic activity and profits.
The latter are anticipated by banks, which find it optimal to charge a lower spread and lock in new
customers into bank-firm lending relationships. Similar arguments apply to the contractionary
government spending shock, which crowds in private investment.
In the presence of a credit-growth-augmented Taylor rule, the central bank partially counteracts
fluctuations of lending. In the model, lending has real effects because it is instrumental for the
acquisition of capital. Therefore, for those shocks in response to which lending exhibits a pro-
cyclical behaviour, the contraction of output is more severe in the absence of a credit-growth-
augmented Taylor rule. On the contrary, for the preference shock and (to a lower extent) the
government spending shock – which yields a counter-cyclical lending response – such a Taylor
rule leads to a relatively more severe output contraction. The presence of lending relationships
consistently generates responses of the bank spread of opposite sign relative to those of lending.
Thus, the general lesson to be learned is that leaning against the wind has a stabilising effect on
output for those shocks that imply a pro-cyclical response of lending and counter-cyclical response
of the bank spread.
3.4 Variance decomposition
Movements in output, lending, bank spread and inflation are now decomposed into parts caused
by each shock at different time horizons, based on the mean of the model’s posterior distribution.
Table 4 reports both the conditional and the unconditional variance decomposition.
While, on impact, demand shocks play a dominant role in affecting output dynamics, in the
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Horizon Structural shocks
TFP Gov. Mon. Preference Invest. Price Wage
spending policy specific mark-up mark-up
Output 1 3.45 42.16 5.44 13.51 9.63 13.14 12.68
4 9.46 16.80 2.87 3.36 14.04 24.60 28.87
8 13.60 9.38 1.55 1.52 11.11 27.05 35.79
20 21.54 6.72 0.91 1.56 8.55 27.46 33.27
40 26.25 6.47 0.81 1.58 8.11 26.50 30.29
uncon. 27.45 6.42 0.79 1.57 8.01 26.09 29.66
Lending 1 3.95 0.18 1.36 2.52 68.09 12.26 11.63
4 7.03 0.37 0.88 4.66 49.29 18.04 19.74
8 10.49 0.59 0.53 6.59 35.10 21.75 24.96
20 17.24 1.00 0.35 7.66 25.36 24.09 24.30
40 18.81 1.11 0.35 7.46 25.05 23.52 23.70
uncon. 18.71 1.10 0.34 7.48 25.13 23.56 23.67
Bank spread 1 3.44 0.15 1.65 2.16 71.39 11.13 10.08
4 7.00 0.37 0.96 4.65 49.32 18.01 19.69
8 10.02 0.57 0.70 6.33 37.69 20.69 23.99
20 8.95 0.52 0.72 6.35 38.64 19.50 25.32
40 9.81 0.55 0.66 6.76 36.31 20.40 25.50
uncon. 9.94 0.56 0.66 6.75 36.26 20.38 25.45
Inflation 1 14.02 1.22 4.16 7.48 2.34 39.16 31.61
4 12.76 1.17 5.97 8.70 3.73 30.40 37.27
8 12.39 1.14 6.36 8.56 4.39 30.27 36.89
20 11.91 1.09 6.10 8.70 4.32 30.02 37.87
40 11.91 1.09 6.07 8.69 4.48 29.95 37.81
uncon. 12.00 1.10 6.05 8.68 4.54 29.91 37.71
Table 4: Variance decomposition
longer term the TFP shock together with the other two supply shocks – wage and price mark-up –
are its main drivers. These three shocks account for about 30% of output fluctuations on impact,
more than 60% at a one-year horizon and more than 80% at a five-year horizon, with demand
shocks having a minor effect. The role of government and monetary policy shocks decay over time.
These results are in line with Smets and Wouters (2007).
The unconditional variance decomposition of lending shows that the three supply shocks ac-
counts for almost 65% of variation in lending. However, differently from output dynamics, the
investment-specific technology shock plays a stronger role: on impact it dominates – explaining
68% of lending fluctuations – and in the longer term it accounts for about 25% of the variation
in lending. This results is not surprising as this shocks affects the investment Euler equation and
lending is used to finance purchases of capital goods.
Results on the variance decomposition of the bank spread show that, on impact, the investment-
specific technology shock is the most important exogenous source of its variation. Price and wage
mark-up shocks also play an important role. The model features a tight (negative) relationship
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Figure 3: Model-implied cyclical deviations of lending and bank spread (shaded areas indicate
NBER recessions)
between the bank spread and lending. Hence, those shocks playing a key role in explaining the dy-
namics of lending are likely to play a similar role in accounting for the variation of the bank spread.
On this point it is important to stress that the shocks that are dominant sources of movements
in lending and the bank spread imply a pro-cyclical response of the former and a counter-cyclical
response of the latter (as reported in Section 3.3). The series of these two variables implied by
the model, as a result of the shocks hitting the US economy during the Great Moderation, are
depicted in Figure 3. The model predicts a pronounced fall of lending and a rapid surge of the bank
spread during recessions. In addition, the model captures the low lending rates and the build-up
of non-financial business sector debt of the late 1990s, and the sudden collapse in the early 2000s
concurrent with the burst of the dot-com bubble.
Price and wage mark-up shocks are also the dominant factors behind both short-run and
medium-run movements in inflation.
4 Optimised simple monetary policy rules
The analysis so far has brought a general equilibrium model with banking frictions to the data
and has provided evidence that US monetary policy leaned against the wind blowing from the
market for loans during the Great Moderation. This had a partial stabilisation role towards credit
exuberance. In this section we pose a normative question: should the monetary policy rate react
to developments in the loan market? To answer this question we rely on the literature on optimal
monetary policy whereby optimised simple interest-rate feedback rules responding to promptly
observable macroeconomic indicators are able to closely mimic the Ramsey rule (Schmitt-Grohe
and Uribe, 2007; Levine et al., 2008).
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To accomplish this task we rewrite the Taylor-type interest-rate feedback rule (16) as
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= ρr log
(
Rnt−1
R¯n
)
+ αpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ αy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ αs log
(
Lt
Lt−1
Πt
)
, (20)
where αpi ≡ (1−ρr)ρpi, αy ≡ (1−ρr)ρy and αs ≡ (1−ρr)ρs. This re-parametrization allows for the
possibility of integral rules with a unitary persistence parameter (ρr = 1). Then we numerically
search for those feedback coefficients in (20) to maximise the present value of life-time utility,
which reads
Ωt = Et
[
(1− β)
∞∑
s=0
βsU (Xt+s, 1−Ht+s)
]
, (21)
given the equilibrium conditions of the model. Assuming no growth in the steady state, we follow
Levine et al. (2008) and rewrite equation (21) in recursive form as
Ωt = (1− β)U (Xt, 1−Ht) + βEt [Ωt+1] . (22)
Given the numerous frictions in our model, this optimisation problem does not collapse to the
minimisation of an ad-hoc loss function. In addition, while more stylised models allow for a
first-order approximation to the equilibrium conditions to be sufficient to accurately approximate
welfare up to a second order, the presence of the frictions in our model requires taking a second-
order approximation both of the mean of Ωt and of the model’s equilibrium conditions around
the deterministic steady state. Given that it is now established in the literature that the Ramsey
solution to NK models sets Π = 1 in the steady state (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2004;
Levine et al., 2008), we take the approximation around a zero-inflation steady state.
Given that we approximate the solution to the equilibrium using perturbation methods and
these do not easily allow incorporating non-negativity constraints, in similar fashion to Levine
et al. (2008), we approximate the zero lower bound (ZLB) constraint on the nominal interest rate
by penalising large deviations of the mean gross rate, R¯n, from its steady state. This is achieved
by replacing our objective function (21) with modified welfare,
Ω∗t = Et
{
(1− β)
∞∑
s=0
βs
[
U (Xt+s, 1−Ht+s)− wr
(
Rnt+s −Rn
)2]}
, (23)
where term wr (Rnt −Rn)2 represents a penalty for deviations of Rnt from its steady state. Hence,
the imposition of the approximate ZLB constraint translates into setting an arbitrarily low per-
period probability of hitting the ZLB, Pr (ZLB) ≡ Pr (Rnt < 1), and appropriately choosing the
weight wr, raising which the variance of Rnt , σ2r , lowers accordingly.
The use of Ω∗t is confined to the design of optimised rules that hit the ZLB only very infre-
quently. However, we make all welfare comparisons among competing rules using the original
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wr σr Pr(ZLB) ρr αpi αy αs Ω ω
Optimised standard Taylor-type rules
0.0 1.09 0.176 0.518 3.000 0.000 – -2.5863 0.00
5.0 0.58 0.042 0.918 1.046 0.002 – -2.5864 -0.04
10.0 0.46 0.014 1.000 0.718 0.002 – -2.5865 -0.08
15.0 0.41 0.006 1.000 0.586 0.000 – -2.5866 -0.12
20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 – -2.5866 -0.12
Optimised augmented Taylor-type rule
16.5 0.39 0.005 1.000 0.555 0.000 0.000 -2.5866 -0.12
20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 0.000 -2.5866 -0.12
Estimated Taylor-type rule
– 0.39 0.005 0.857 0.287 0.003 0.042 -2.5875 -0.48
Table 5: Optimised monetary policy rules
welfare definition Ω. Welfare comparisons can be interpreted in terms of a consumption equivalent
calculation. For a particular equilibrium we compute the increase in the single-period utility, given
by a permanent 1% increase in consumption,
$ ≡ (1− β)−1 [U (1.01X, 1−H)− U (X, 1−H)] . (24)
Then a consumption equivalent welfare change between two inter-temporal welfare outcomes Ω1
and Ω2 is defined as ω ≡ 100× Ω1−Ω2$ , which represents the compensation in terms of permanent
percent change in consumption that the representative agent should receive to be as well off under
regime 2 as under regime 1.
Table 5 first shows the results arising from the computation of optimised standard Taylor-
type rules in which the nominal interest rate features inertia and reacts to inflation and output
(αs = 0). Increasing the penalty parameter wr delivers a smaller and smaller variability of the
nominal interest rate, which translates into a lower and lower per-period probability of hitting
the ZLB. Assuming that the gross nominal interest rate is normally distributed, in the table
Pr (ZLB) = Φ (z0) is computed as the cumulated density function (CDF) of the standard normal
distribution evaluated at z0 ≡ −100(Rn−1)σr . In the absence of the ZLB constraint we impose an
upper bound of 3 on the feedback coefficient to inflation αpi. Leaving this coefficient unconstrained
would imply an implausibly high responsiveness, with immaterial welfare gains. Irrespective of the
value of wr, we replicate the result on “the importance of not responding to output” of Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2007). A higher penalty wr delivers a lower optimal αpi. In the table we compute
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Figure 4: Welfare cost associated to leaning against the wind
the consumption equivalent welfare loss ω relative to the standard Taylor-type rule with wr = 0
(first row). Under this monetary policy rule the ZLB is reached approximately every five quarters,
hence it is clearly not implementable. With wr = 20 the probability of hitting the ZLB is 0.003,
i.e. approximately once every 75 years and the welfare loss is equivalent to a permanent loss in
consumption of 0.12%.
We then move to optimised rules in which the interest rate reacts also to nominal credit growth,
(Lt/Lt−1) Πt, as in Christiano et al. (2010b,a) and Ozkan and Unsal (2013), among others, while
keeping Pr (ZLB) = 0.003. We find a zero optimal responsiveness to nominal credit growth
and that the welfare loss remains unaltered relative to the case of the standard Taylor-type rule.
Appendix E checks the robustness of the results to interest rate rules reacting to alternative
financial variables, such as lending and the bank spread, similarly to Curdia and Woodford (2010)
and Aksoy et al. (2013).
The estimated monetary policy rule implies Pr (ZLB) = 0.005, i.e. that the nominal in-
terest rate hits the ZLB once every 49 years and implies a consumption-equivalent welfare loss of
(0.48− 0.12) % = 0.36%, relative to the optimised rule with the same Pr (ZLB), obtained setting
wr = 16.5.
To check the extent to which the welfare loss suffered from employing the empirical rule is due
to the presence of the responsiveness to nominal credit growth, in Figure 4, we isolate its effect on
welfare by keeping ρr, αpi and αy fixed at their optimal values and by changing αs in the interval
[0, 0.2]. The estimated value of αs = 0.042 implies a small consumption-equivalent loss of around
0.05%. In addition, this exercise unveils also a positive relationship whereby that the economy
suffers a more-than-double welfare loss if αs doubles.
In a nutshell these results show that it is not optimal, and is actually detrimental, for monetary
policy to lean against windy bank lending. This finding can be rationalised by noticing that supply
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Figure 5: Optimal responsiveness of inflation for given degrees of leaning against the wind
shocks (technology, price mark-up and wage mark-up) explain the largest share of business cycle
fluctuations of lending and inflation. Indeed, Section 3.4 shows that the three supply shocks
together explain around 66% and 80% of the unconditional variance of lending and inflation,
respectively. A, say, contractionary shock of such a kind causes lending to decrease and inflation
to rise. A monetary policy that leans against windy bank lending is more accommodative towards
inflation in an attempt to boost lending (as shown in Section 3.3). But this turns out not to be
optimal. In fact, in Figure 5, we show that, if we fix αr = 1, αy = 0, we let αs vary in the interval
[0, 0.2], and we optimise over αpi, the optimal value of this last coefficient monotonically increases
when αs increases, while welfare (not shown) attains virtually the same level for any combination
of the two parameter values. In other words, if monetary policy is forced to react more to a(n)
tightening (expansion) of lending growth, it is optimal for it to react more also to the increase
(decrease) in inflation. As the two objectives are conflicting, there is no “divine coincidence” in
this case and the nominal interest rate achieves a better outcome if it only stabilises inflation.
This result is in line with Faia and Monacelli (2007), who find that the presence of only one policy
instrument – the nominal interest rate – cannot simultaneously neutralise both financial frictions
and price stickiness and that a strong anti-inflationary stance always leads to the highest level of
welfare.
To show the importance of the source of business cycle fluctuations on the optimality of mon-
etary policy responses, in Figure 6, again, we keep ρr, αpi and αy fixed at their optimal values and
change αs, after artificially switching off wage mark-up shocks, being these the most prominent
shocks in the unconditional variance decomposition of inflation. This exercise is important as (i)
it shows that, in the absence of such shocks, it would be indeed optimal to lean against windy
bank lending, with an optimal αs around 0.06; and (ii) it allows reconciling our results with the
literature. In fact, Aksoy et al. (2013), in a similar but simpler calibrated model with no wage
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Figure 6: Welfare cost associated to leaning against the wind in the absence of wage mark-up
shocks
mark-up shocks, find leaning against the wind to be optimal. Moreover, Curdia and Woodford
(2010) and Nisticò (2012) show that the optimality of a leaning-against-the-wind-type of monetary
policy is very sensitive to the source of business cycle fluctuations. We deem our research strategy
to be desirable as we first bring an almost canonical model (augmented with banking) to the data;
estimate a set of standard shocks; and on the estimation results we base optimal policy compu-
tations. Appendix E investigates also the robustness of the results to scenarios characterised by
higher volatility of business cycle fluctuations. In particular we increase the volatility of shocks
in order to match the levels of output growth volatility observed during the Great Recession or
higher. If the increased volatility is due to a proportional increase in all shocks, results remain
unchanged. We find some room for leaning against the wind if the increase in volatility is entirely
due to the investment-specific shock, in response to which lending and inflation positively co-move.
5 Concluding remarks
In recent times credit booms and busts have dramatically affected business cycle fluctuations. This
has called for a deeper understanding of credit market conditions and the potential role of central
banks in ensuring financial stability. This paper examines whether monetary policy has reacted
and whether it should indeed react to bank lending growth in the US economy.
We first estimate a DSGE model in which banking frictions arise due to the presence of lending
relationships and monetary policy is set according to a credit-growth-augmented Taylor-type rule.
The empirical results provide evidence that during the Great Moderation monetary policy leaned
against the wind blowing from the loans market.
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We then compare the welfare implications of estimated and optimised interest-rate rules. Res-
ults unveil that the estimated responsiveness of monetary policy to credit growth delivers a small
welfare loss, but the higher such a responsiveness the higher is the detriment to welfare. Therefore,
the main lesson that can be learned from the analysis is that the monetary policy rate should not
respond to credit exuberance more than it did in the past. If anything, it should not respond
at all. Such a finding can be rationalised by noticing that supply shocks are the main drivers of
output, lending and inflation fluctuations in the estimated model and that these shocks imply a
trade-off between inflation and output stabilisation. Given the pro-cyclical behaviour of lending,
it turns out to be optimal for monetary policy to respond only to inflation. On this aspect, the
paper highlights that the optimality of a leaning-against-the-wind policy is sensitive to the sources
of business cycle fluctuations.
The findings of this paper agree with the recent tendency in central banking to move towards
macroprudential instruments as tools to promote financial stability. Indeed, a bolder research effort
is necessary to identify effective instruments and design rules that achieve the goal of reducing
systemic risk without conflicting with the objective of inflation stabilisation.
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Appendix
A Symmetric equilibrium
Production function and marginal products:
Yt = e
A
t H
α
t (UtKt)
1−α (A.1)
FK,t =
(1− α)
µt
Yt
UtKt
(A.2)
FH,t =
α
µt
Yt
Ht
(A.3)
Utility function, marginal utilities, Euler equation, and wage setting:
U(Xt, 1−Ht) =
[
(Xt)
φ (1−Ht)1−φ
]1−σc
1− σc (A.4)
UXt = φ (1−Ht)1−φ
[
Xφt (1−Ht)1−φ
]−σc
Xφ−1t (A.5)
UHt = − (1− φ) (1−Ht)−φXφt
[
Xφt (1−Ht)1−φ
]−σc
(A.6)
Xt = Ct − θSt−1 (A.7)
St = ρSt−1 + (1− ρ)Ct (A.8)
eBt UXt = βEt
[
eBt+1UXct+1(1 +R
D
t+1)
]
(A.9)
(
1− eWt ηW
)
+
eWt η
W
µWt
− ξW (ΠWt − Π¯)ΠWt + ξWEt [Λt,t+1 (ΠWt+1 − Π¯)ΠWt Wt+1Ht+1WtHt
]
= 0 (A.10)
µWt =
Wt
−UH,t
UXt
(A.11)
Investment demand, labor demand, and price setting:
Kt+1 = (1− δ)Kt + It
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)]
eIt (A.12)
S
(
It
It−1
)
=
ψ
2
(
It
It−1
− 1
)2
(A.13)
S ′
(
It
It−1
)
= ψ
(
It
It−1
− 1
)
(A.14)
Qt = EtΛt,t+1
[
Ut+1FK,t+1 −Ψt+1 +Qt+1(1− δ)
]
(A.15)
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Et
[
Λt,t+1(1 +R
L
t )
]
= eItQt
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1− S
(
It
It−1
)
− S ′
(
It
It−1
)
It
It−1
]
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eIt+1Qt+1S
′
(
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)(
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(A.16)
Ψt = γ1 (Ut − 1) + γ2
2
(Ut − 1)2 (A.17)
Ψ′t = γ1 + γ2 (Ut − 1) (A.18)
Ψ′t = FK,t (A.19)
Λt,t+1 = βEt
[
λt+1
λt
]
(A.20)
FH,t = Wt (A.21)
1− ePt η + ePt ηMCt − ξ
(
Πt − Π¯
)
Πt + ξEt
[
Λt,t+1
(
Πt+1 − Π¯
)
Πt+1
Yt+1
Yt
]
= 0 (A.22)
µt = 1/MC (A.23)
Demand and supply for loans
Lt = It (A.24)
Lt = X
L
t + θ
LSLt−1 (A.25)
SLt = %
LSLt−1 + (1− %L)Lt (A.26)
Lt = Dt (A.27)
νt = EtΛt,t+1
[(
RLt+1 −RDt+1
)
+ νt+1θ
L(1− %L)] (A.28)
Et [Λt,t+1Lt+1] = νtη
LEt
[
XLt+1
]
(A.29)
spreadt =
(
1 +RLt
)
/
(
1 +RDt
)
(A.30)
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt +
ξ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt + ξ
W
2
(
ΠWt − Π¯
)2
WtHt + ΨtKt (A.31)
Taylor rule and Fisher equation:
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= ρr log
(
Rnt−1
R¯n
)
+ (1− ρr)
[
ρpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ ρy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ ρs log
(
Lt
Lt−1
Πt
)]
+ eRt
(A.32)
RDt+1 = Et
[
Rnt
Πt+1
]
(A.33)
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Exogenous processes:
log
(
eκt
e¯κ
)
= ρκ log
(
eκt−1
e¯κ
)
+ κt , κ = {A,B,G, I, R, P,W} (A.34)
B Steady state
K and H solve equations (A.28) and (A.3), evaluated at the steady state, while the value of the
remaining variables is found recursively by using the following relationships
Π = 1 (B.1)
ΠW = Π (B.2)
Λ = β (B.3)
U = 1 (B.4)
µW =
η˜
η˜ − 1 (B.5)
MC =
η − 1
η
(B.6)
µ = 1/MC (B.7)
RD =
1
β
− 1 (B.8)
I = δK (B.9)
Y = HαK1−α (B.10)
G =
G
Y
Y (B.11)
C = Y − I −G (B.12)
S = C (B.13)
X = (1− θ)C (B.14)
U =
[
(X)φ (1−H)1−φ
]1−σc
1− σc (B.15)
UX = φ (1−H)1−φ
[
Xφ (1−H)1−φ
]−σc
Xφ−1 (B.16)
UH = − (1− φ) (1−H)−φXφ
[
Xφ (1−H)1−φ
]−σc
(B.17)
W = µW (−UH/UX) (B.18)
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L = I (B.19)
SL = L (B.20)
XL = (1− θL)L (B.21)
D = L (B.22)
FK =
(1− α)
µ
Y
K
(B.23)
R =
βFK
β (1− β (1− δ)) − 1 (B.24)
ν = ΛL
(
1 +RL
)
/
(
ηLXL
)
(B.25)
spread =
(
1 +RL
)
/
(
1 +RD
)
(B.26)
FH = W (B.27)
Q = Λ
(
1 +RL
)
(B.28)
Ψ = 0 (B.29)
γ1 = FK (B.30)
Ψ′ = γ1 (B.31)
γ2 =
γ1
σu
(B.32)
S = 0 (B.33)
S ′ = 0 (B.34)
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C Data sources and transformations
This section discusses the sources of the seven observables used in the estimation and their trans-
formation. GDP, GDP deflator inflation, the federal funds rate, civilian population (CNP160V)
and civilian employment (CE160V) are downloaded from the ALFRED database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Private consumption expenditures and fixed private investment are
extracted from the NIPA Table 1.1.5 of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Average weekly hours
worked (PRS85006023) and compensation per hour (PRS85006103) are downloaded from the Bur-
eau of Labor Statistics.
Data are transformed as in Smets and Wouters (2007). In particular, GDP, consumption and
investment are transformed in real per-capita terms by dividing their nominal values by the GDP
deflator and the civilian population. Real wages are computed by dividing compensation per hour
by the GDP deflator. As shown in the measurement equations in Section (3.1), the observable
variables of GDP, consumption, investment and wages are expressed in first differences. Hours
worked are multiplied by civilian employment, expressed in per capita terms and demeaned. The
inflation rate is computed as a quarter-on-quarter difference of the log of the GDP deflator. The
federal funds rate is expressed in quarterly terms and the remaining variables are expressed as 100
times their logarithm. All series are seasonally adjusted by their sources.
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D Posterior estimates of the model featuring a standard Taylor
rule
Parameter Prior Posterior Mean
Distrib. Mean Std/df
Structural
Relative risk aversion σc Normal 1.50 0.10 1.53 [1.36;1.69]
Habits in consumption θ Beta 0.70 0.10 0.69 [0.60;0.78]
Habit persist. in consumption ρ Beta 0.50 0.10 0.63 [0.51;0.75]
Deep habits in banking θL Beta 0.70 0.125 0.72 [0.53;0.94]
Habit persist. in banking %L Beta 0.70 0.125 0.82 [0.65;0.98]
Price stickiness ξ Normal 30.0 5.00 41.79 [35.30;48.51]
Wage stickiness ξW Normal 100.0 10.00 80.22 [59.68;100.27]
Investment adjust. costs ψ Normal 4.00 1.50 4.45 [2.88;6.01]
Capital utilisation ηu Beta 0.50 0.10 0.86 [0.77;0.95]
Inflation -Taylor rule ρpi Normal 1.50 0.20 2.08 [1.83;2.34]
Output -Taylor rule ρy Beta 0.10 0.05 0.01 [0.00;0.02]
Interest rate smoothing ρr Beta 0.80 0.10 0.83 [0.80;0.86]
Averages
Trend growth rate γ Normal 0.44 0.10 0.41 [0.35;0.47]
Inflation rate p¯i Gamma 0.63 0.10 0.65 [0.56;0.75]
Interest rate r¯n Gamma 1.31 0.10 1.29 [1.15;1.42]
Hours of work h¯ Normal 0.00 0.10 -0.01 [-0.17;0.16]
Shocks
TFP ρA Beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 [0.92;0.99]
σA IG 0.10 2.0 0.46 [0.41;0.51]
Government spending ρG Beta 0.50 0.20 0.97 [0.94;0.99]
σG IG 0.10 2.0 2.24 [1.97;2.49]
Interest rate σR IG 0.10 2.0 0.15 [0.13;0.17]
Investment-specific ρI Beta 0.50 0.20 0.80 [0.70;0.89]
σI IG 0.10 2.0 2.54 [1.65;3.46]
Preference ρB Beta 0.50 0.20 0.79 [0.70;0.89]
σB IG 0.10 2.0 1.64 [1.24;2.03]
Price mark-up ρP Beta 0.50 0.20 0.96 [0.94;0.99]
σP IG 0.10 2.0 1.38 [1.20;1.56]
Wage mark-up ρW Beta 0.50 0.20 0.91 [0.84;0.98]
σW IG 0.10 2.0 3.64 [2.88;4.43]
Log-likelihood -550.132
Table D.1: Prior and posterior distributions of the estimated parameters of the NK model featuring
a standard Taylor rule
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St wr σr Pr(ZLB) ρr αpi αy αs Ω ω
Optimised standard Taylor-type rules
– 20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 – -2.5866 -0.12
Optimised augmented Taylor-type rule
Lt/Lt−1 20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 0.000 -2.587 -0.12
Lt/L 20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 0.000 -2.5866 -0.12
spreadt/spread 20.0 0.37 0.003 1.000 0.496 0.000 0.000 -2.5866 -0.12
Table E.1: Optimised alternative augmented monetary policy rules
E Robustness exercises for optimal policy
This section illustrates a series of modifications in the DSGE model in order to (i) investigate the
robustness of the results to a Taylor-type rules augmented with financial variables different from
nominal credit growth and (ii) analyse the effects of a higher volatility of structural shocks on
optimal policy.
We can write the Taylor rule as
log
(
Rnt
R¯n
)
= ρr log
(
Rnt−1
R¯n
)
+ αpi log
(
Πt
Π¯
)
+ αy log
(
Yt
Y¯
)
+ αs log (St) , (E.1)
where St is a financial variable the monetary policy rate may react to. In particular, we consider (i)
real credit growth, Lt/Lt−1; (ii) the percent deviation of lending from its steady state (Lt/L); and
(iii) the bank spread, spreadt/spread ≡ (1+RLt )/(1+RDt )/(1+RL)/(1+RD), similarly to Curdia and Woodford
(2010) and Aksoy et al. (2013).
Table E.1 shows that the optimal response to all financial variables is always zero. The op-
timal ρr , αpi and αy are identical to the ones under the standard Taylor-type rule for the same
Pr(ZLB) = 0.003; hence, the welfare loss, ω, is unaltered. This exercise unveils that monetary
policy should not respond to any financial variable considered.
The shocks used for the computation of optimised simple rules are those estimated using data
of the Great Moderation, characterised by low volatility of business cycle fluctuations. Therefore it
seems appropriate to check whether the main results hold in more turbulent periods characterised
by higher volatilities. The Great Recession witnessed a double standard deviation of real output
growth compared to the average level observed during the Great Moderation.
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Figure E.1: Welfare cost associated to leaning against the wind for proportional increases in the
volatilities of all shocks (STD = standard deviation of real output growth).
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Figure E.2: Welfare cost associated to leaning against the wind for larger volatilities of the
investment-specific technology shock (STD = standard deviation of real output growth).
Figure E.1 presents a counterfactual experiment in which we proportionally change the volatilit-
ies of all the structural shocks to match a standard deviation of output double and triple compared
to the baseline estimated model – by keeping ρr , αpi and αy fixed at their optimal values and by
changing αs in the interval [0; 0.2]. The higher the standard deviation, the stronger is the trade-off
between inflation and financial stabilisation. Hence the welfare loss is greater under the most
volatile scenario and it monotonically increases for a more aggressive responsiveness to nominal
credit growth.
In order to highlight the importance of supply versus demand shocks in the design of optimal
policy, we then artificially calibrate only the volatility of the investment-specific technology shock
to match the higher standard deviation of output, keeping the volatilities of the other shocks at
their estimated values shown in Table 2. This exogenous disturbance is a demand shock, in which
output, lending and inflation move into the same direction. Figure E.2 shows that it would be
indeed optimal to lean against windy bank lending, with an optimal αs around 0.015 in the higher
volatility scenarios. This result confirms that the source of business cycle fluctuations is crucial
for the optimality of the leaning-against-the-wind policy.
34
